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Missouri and Indiana Lay an Egg: Why the
Latest Attempt at Invalidating State Factory
Farm Regulations Must Fail
Louis Cholden-Brown
At the end of 2017, two original jurisdiction cases addressing
the authority of states to regulate the treatment of farm animals
were filed at the Supreme Court.1 Overlapping, but not identical,
groups of thirteen States challenged California and Massachusetts
laws banning the sale of eggs, as well as pork and veal in
Massachusetts, raised in conditions deemed cruel by the defendant
States as violative of the Commerce Clause.
These dual challenges, which raise unique questions of
original jurisdiction and standing with which this Article does
not concern itself, are but the latest in a series of cases seeking to
restrict state and local regulation of animal welfare.2 As with
prior attempts, the litigants misconstrue the current thrust of
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the legitimacy of
state action to limit its complicity in the spread of disease and
moral degradation. Contrary to their invitation, given the broad
ambit of the police power and the ill-suitedness of the judiciary to
weigh competing local interests and out-of-state burdens, in the
absence of discriminatory intent, existing regulatory conflict or
inescapable effects on prices or practices, the Court is compelled
to uphold such statutes.
This Article begins in Part I by addressing the current
conception of the dormant Commerce Clause and its retrenchment,
before discussing prior federal litigation concerning subnational
laws governing animal food products deemed cruel locally and their

Senior Advisor, New York City 2019 Charter Revision Commission. I am indebted
to the many colleagues who first alerted me to these statutes and collaborated in the early
phases of the research that became this Article as well as my vegetarian family who were
a constant source of support despite never understanding why I was writing about “meat.”
The views expressed represent mine alone and are not attributable to any institution or
organization with which I am previously or presently affiliated.
1 Motion For Leave To File Bill Of Complaint, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 2017); Motion For Leave To File A Bill Of Complaint, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No.
22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).
2 See Ernesto Hernández-López, Sustainable Food and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 549, 550 (2018).

161

162

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 22:1

universal finding of no dormant Commerce Clause conflict in
Part II. Parts III and IV in turn chart the passage of the
California and Massachusetts statutes respectively, as well as
the dormant Commerce Clause arguments presently before the
Court. Part V briefly reflects upon the argument advanced by the
federal government in response to Calls for the Views of the
Solicitor General (CSVGs) in the two cases. Part VI closes by
implicating why, when faced with nondiscriminatory laws such
as these predicated on legitimate, albeit unquantifiable, local
interests, the Court should decline to engage in benefits
balancing and uphold the ordinances as rationally related to
territorial interests.
I. DORMANT ELEMENTS OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”3
In addition, courts have “long interpreted the Commerce Clause as
an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a
conflicting federal statute.”4 This implicit restraint is often referred to
as the dormant, or negative, Commerce Clause.5 The “fundamental
objective” of the dormant Commerce Clause is to protect the national
market from “preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its
residents or resident competitors.”6 Therefore, a statute “motivated
by simple economic protectionism” that “discriminates on its face
against interstate commerce” is “subject to a virtually per se rule of
invalidity which can only be overcome by a showing that the State
has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.”7 In this
dormant Commerce Clause context, discrimination “simply means
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”8 However, the
Supreme Court “never has articulated clear criteria for deciding
when proof of a discriminatory purpose and/or effect is sufficient
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
5 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997).
6 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Tracy, 519 U.S. at 299) (internal quotation omitted).
7 United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 338–39 (emphasis added) (internal citations and
quotation omitted). This per se rule is motivated by a belief that “when ‘the burden of
state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the
operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state
are affected.’” Id. at 345 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767–68
n.2 (1945)). The “abstract possibility” of the existence of less discriminatory means is
insufficient to render a statute unconstitutional as the state “is not required to develop
new and unproven means of protection . . . .” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986)
(internal citations and quotation omitted).
8 Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
3
4
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for a state or local law to be discriminatory.”9 “Indeed, the cases
in this area seem quite inconsistent”10 and Justice Scalia has
observed “once one gets beyond facial discrimination our
negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence becomes (and long has
been) a quagmire.”11 The Supreme Court has considered and
rejected the argument that a “statute is discriminatory because it
will apply most often to out-of-state entities” in a market
comprised of more out-of-state than in-state participants.12 As
early as thirty years ago, some argued a “court should strike
down a state law if and only if it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that protectionist purpose on the part of the legislators
contributed substantially to the adoption of the law or any
feature of the law,”13 and in recent years, the “zone of
presumptive illegality”14 has narrowed to only preclude
intentional protectionism.15

9 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 444–45
(4th ed. 2011).
10 Id. at 445.
11 W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(internal quotation omitted). Justice Scalia was a prolific critic of the dormant Commerce
Clause at large. See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental problem with our negative Commerce
Clause cases is that the Constitution does not contain a negative Commerce Clause.”). As
are Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. See, e.g.,Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 614–17 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Direct Mktg.
Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he
whole field in which we are asked to operate today—dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause
doctrine—might be said to be an artifact of judicial precedent.”).
12 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
13 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1148 (1986).
14 Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. L. REV.
255, 277 (2017).
15 See, e.g., C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“The
central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws
whose object is local economic protectionism” because these are the “laws that would
excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to
prevent”); United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 338 (2007) (“Discriminatory laws motivated by ‘simple economic protectionism’ are
subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity . . . .”’ (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))). It should be noted that arguably City of Philadelphia
stands for a different principle. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (“[W]here simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity
has been erected.”) (emphasis added); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (holding that the dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits economic
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors”) (emphasis added); Dep’t of Revenue of
Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“The modern law of what
has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about ‘economic
protectionism that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests
by burdening out-of-state competitors.’”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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By contrast, in what has become known as the Pike16
balancing test, when a statute “regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest” with only incidental
effects on interstate commerce, “it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits.”17 A putative benefit need not be
explicitly stated in the challenged legislation to be legitimate,18
and neither its wisdom nor effectiveness, nor whether the
benefits “actually come into being” are of any consideration.19
Absent “discriminating against articles of commerce coming
from outside the State,” “the States retain authority under their
general police powers to regulate matters of ‘legitimate local
concern,’ even though interstate commerce may be affected.”20
States possess a “right to impose even burdensome regulations in
the interest of local health and safety” so long as the regulations
are not attempts to “advance their own commercial interests.”21
The authority to regulate for the public health, safety, morals or
welfare is broad,22 and the power “to prescribe regulations which
shall prevent the production within its borders of impure foods”
is well established.23 “[A]rticles as would spread disease and
pestilence” are not within the protection of the Commerce Clause
regardless of such regulations incidentally affecting interstate
commerce, “when the object of the regulation is not to that end,
but is a legitimate attempt to protect the people of the state.”24
The welfare of all animals, not merely those bound for consumption,

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Id.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 348, 354 (1951).
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 313 (1st Cir. 2005).
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (internal citation omitted).
H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 2018) (granting
cities in Illinois “the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare”); TUCSON CODE ch. VII § 1(32) (Supp. 2016) (granting mayor and
council authority to “adopt and enforce by ordinance all such measures . . . expedient or
necessary for the promotion and protection of the health, comfort, safety, life, welfare and
property of the inhabitants of the city, the preservation of peace and good order, the
promotion of public morals”); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“It
belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police powers of the state, and
to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of
the public morals, the public health, or the public safety.”); Cresenzi Bird Imps. v. New
York, 658 F. Supp. 1441, 1447 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognizing the state’s “interest in
cleansing its markets of commerce which the Legislature finds to be unethical”); Robert J.
Delahunty & Antonio F. Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State: The Supreme Court’s
Vision of the Police Power in the Age of Globalization, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 637, 676 (2005) (“The
States’ authority to pursue specifically moral objectives is deeply rooted in the American
constitutional tradition. Indeed, it is one of the fundamental features of our federalism.”).
23 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915).
24 Id. at 59–60.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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is commonly understood to be within that power 25 and, in one series
of examples, federal courts have uniformly found the regulation of
animal welfare standards for animals for sale as pets do not conflict
with the dormant Commerce Clause.26
Despite its name, “incidental burdens” are any “burdens on
interstate commerce that exceed the burdens on intrastate
commerce.”27 The Commerce Clause “protects the interstate
market, not particular interstate firms”28 and individual losses or
businesses restructuring suffered by particular firms do not
constitute sufficient burden. Stated otherwise, “the statute, at a
minimum, must impose a burden on interstate commerce that is
qualitatively or quantitatively different from that imposed on

25 See 3B C.J.S. Animals § 198 (2018) (“Statutory provisions prohibiting cruelty to
animals are sustainable as a valid exercise of the police power.”) (footnote omitted); Cavel
Int’l v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[s]tates have a
legitimate interest in prolonging the lives of animals that their population happens to
like” and that “a state is permitted, within reason, to express disgust at what people do
with the dead”); DeHart v. Town of Austin, 39 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The
regulation of animals has long been recognized as part of the historic police power of the
States.”); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, No.
17-3163, 2018 WL 3655854, at *5 (7th Cir. June 25, 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
(“[A]nimal welfare affects human welfare. Many people feel disgust, humiliation, or
shame when animals or their remains are poorly treated.”).
26 Park Pet Shop v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017); N.Y. Pet Welfare
Ass’n v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no need to consider the
. . . Pike balancing test. Because the Sourcing Law imposes no incidental burdens on
interstate commerce, it cannot impose any that are clearly excessive in relation to its local
benefits, and therefore survives scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.”); Mo. Pet
Breeders Ass’n v. County of Cook, 119 F. Supp. 3d 865, 875–76 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Puppies ‘N
Love v. City of Phoenix, 116 F. Supp. 3d 971, 996 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“The Ordinance is not an
act of economic protectionism. It is a legitimate attempt to curb the problems associated
with the inhumane treatment of animals and local dog homelessness and euthanasia.
Plaintiffs’ claim that the Ordinance violates the dormant Commerce Clause fails as a matter
of law.”); Perfect Puppy v. City of E. Providence, 98 F. Supp. 3d 408, 415–18 (D.R.I. 2015).
Contra Six Kingdoms Enters. v. City of El Paso, No. EP-10-CV-485-KC, 2011 WL 65864, at
*8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2011) (“By limiting the price of puppies to an amount that sellers of
puppies from distant states cannot meet, the ordinance plainly has a discriminatory impact
upon out-of-state interests.”).
27 N.Y. State Trawlers Ass’n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471–72 (1981)); see also Automated
Salvage Transp. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., 155 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Where a
regulation does not have this disparate impact on interstate commerce, then ‘we must
conclude that . . . [it] has not imposed any “incidental burdens” on interstate commerce
that “are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”’ Thus, the minimum
showing required to succeed in a Commerce Clause challenge to a state regulation is that
it have a disparate impact on interstate commerce. The fact that it may otherwise affect
commerce is not sufficient.’”); Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1015
(9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “incidental burdens” on interstate commerce include
disruption of interstate travel and shipping due to lack of uniformity in state laws,
impacts on commerce beyond the borders of the state, or burdens that fall more heavily on
out-of-state interests).
28 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (“[T]he Commerce Clause
[does not] protect[ ] the particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market.”).
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intrastate commerce”29 such as to make the statute “unreasonable or
irrational.”30 If no such unequal burden is shown, a reviewing court
need not proceed further.31 Unless a plaintiff demonstrates that the
statute imposes some burden on interstate commerce that is different
from the burden imposed on intrastate commerce, courts should
refrain entirely from weighing a statute’s costs and benefits.32
The competency or propriety of courts undertaking these
inquiries has been much maligned. The Fourth Circuit has
criticized the Pike balancing test as “often too soggy to properly
cabin the judicial inquiry or effectively prevent the district court
from assuming a super-legislative role;”33 while on the Tenth
Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch called Pike “a pretty grand, even
‘ineffable,’ all-things-considered sort of test, one requiring judges
(to attempt) to compare wholly incommensurable goods for wholly
29 National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Park
Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (“Pike balancing is triggered only when the challenged law
discriminates against interstate commerce in practical application.”) (emphasis in original).
30 Alaska Airlines v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 1991). A statute
is “unreasonable or irrational . . . where the asserted benefits of the statute are in fact
illusory or relate to goals that evidence an impermissible favoritism of in-state industry
over out-of-state industry.” Id. See also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n v. Holshouser, 408 F. Supp. 857,
861 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
31 Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 109. “Pike balancing is triggered only when the challenged law
discriminates against interstate commerce in practical application. Pike is not the default
standard of review for any state or local law that affects interstate commerce.” Park Pet
Shop, 872 F.3d at 502. “[U]nless the challenged law discriminates against interstate
commerce in practical effect, the dormant Commerce Clause does not come into play and
Pike balancing does not apply.” Id. See also Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of
Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a default application of Pike and
holding “the dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause does not replace the rational-basis inquiry
with a ‘broader, all-weather, be-reasonable vision of the Constitution’”).
32 See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 360 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I would abandon the Pike-balancing enterprise altogether and leave these
quintessentially legislative judgments with the branch to which the Constitution assigns
them.”); see also United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (noting that the Pike balancing test was “reserved” for laws that have
incidental effects on interstate commerce, but finding “it unnecessary to decide whether
the ordinances impose any incidental burden on interstate commerce because any
arguable burden does not exceed the public benefits of the ordinances”); Exxon Corp., 437
U.S. at 125–26 (“Plainly, the Maryland statute [prohibiting producer or refiner of
petroleum products from operating retail service station within the State] does not
discriminate against interstate goods, nor does it favor local producers and refiners. Since
Maryland’s entire gasoline supply flows in interstate commerce and since there are no
local producers or refiners, such claims of disparate treatment between interstate and
local commerce would be meritless. . . . The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls
on some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination
against interstate commerce.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d
200, 209 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This balancing test, however, does not invite courts to
second-guess legislatures by estimating the probable costs and benefits of the statute, nor is
it within the competency of courts to do so.”); Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1130 (finding that the
dormant Commerce Clause does not “authorize a [court to undertake] a comprehensive
review of the law’s benefits, free of any obligation to accept the legislature’s judgment”).
33 Colon Health Ctrs. of Am. v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 546 (4th Cir. 2013).
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different populations (measuring the burdens on out-of-staters
against the benefits to in-staters).”34 Justice Scalia explained this
dilemma at greater length in Davis:
The burdens and the benefits are always incommensurate, and cannot
be placed on the opposite balances of a scale without assigning a
policy-based weight to each of them. It is a matter not of weighing
apples against apples, but of deciding whether three apples are better
than six tangerines. . . . [Y]ou cannot decide which interest “outweighs”
the other without deciding which interest is more important to you.35

There is “no clear line between these two strands of analysis” and
several cases, including Pike itself, that have purported to apply
the undue burden test “turned in whole or in part on the
discriminatory character of the challenged state regulations.”36
This has led some courts to “wonder just what work Pike does”37
and several scholars suggest that the Supreme Court has “sub
silentio” repudiated the balancing test by failing to invalidate any
laws under it since 198238 and “burden review has decayed into
minimal rational basis review at best.”39
When a state “project[s] its legislation into” other jurisdictions40
and “directly controls” conduct wholly beyond its borders, whether to
punish, reward or otherwise influence, and irrespective of whether it
is discriminatory or its extraterritorial reach was intended, the
statute is per se invalid.41 Despite the doctrine often being premised
on the possibility of inconsistent regulatory regimes if more than one
state were to regulate in this space, the actual existence of a conflict

Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015).
Davis, 553 U.S. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia, never at a loss for quips, has
also compared this inquiry to “judging whether a particular line is longer than a
particular rock is heavy.” Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters. 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
36 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997).
37 Cavel Int’l v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2007). Some courts, citing a
footnote in Tracy, 519 U.S. at 298 n.12, have suggested that Pike is only violated when a
“genuinely nondiscriminatory” state law “undermine[s] a compelling need for national
uniformity in regulation.” See LSP Transmission Holdings v. Lange, No. CV 17-4490
(DWF/HB), 2018 WL 3075976, at *9 (D. Minn. June 21, 2018) (finding “[t]he Supreme Court
[in this footnote] also noted the narrow application of the Pike test”); Owner-Operator Indep.
Drivers Ass’n v. Urbach, 718 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (App. Div. 2000) (“[I]t is incumbent upon
plaintiffs to identify some prohibited interference with interstate commerce under the Pike
undue burden test to obviate the need to establish that their commercial interests have
received disparate treatment from those of similarly situated intrastate operators.”). But see
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, 401 F.3d 560, 572 (4th Cir. 2005).
38 Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 493 (2008).
39 Francis, supra note 14, at 277.
40 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583
(1986) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)).
41 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1994).
34
35
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is not a prerequisite for its application.42 However, as changes to
the global economy blur the line between intrastate and interstate
transactions, the doctrine has atrophied.
Extraterritoriality’s demise is in part attributable to its birth
during an earlier phase of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
where the Court found a regulation of interstate commerce
permissible based on whether it was a “direct” or “indirect”
regulation;43 the Court’s furnishing of alternative grounds for its
holding in MITE and Healy are a recognition of such by its
members.44 As the Court’s conception of states’ territories have
grown more fluid in other areas of law, such as personal
jurisdiction45 and choice-of-law,46 to reflect the increasingly
interconnected world, some have called for it to do so here. Justice
Gorsuch’s 2015 decision, while still a judge of the Tenth Circuit, in
Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Epel,47 labeled the
extraterritoriality doctrine “the most dormant doctrine in
dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause jurisprudence”48 and no longer
binding.49 He suggested that rather than constituting “a distinct
line” of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Baldwin and
its progeny were examples of the anti-discrimination rule that was
yet to solidify.50 Similarly, Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has
42 Barbara O. Bruckmann, The Case for a Commerce Clause Challenge to State
Antitrust Laws Banning Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
391, 415 (2012) (“[D]irect regulatory conflict appears a sufficient, but not necessary,
condition for demonstrating extraterritorial regulation.”).
43 Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 996 (2013).
44 Healy, 491 U.S. at 340 (striking down a statute because it “discriminate[d] against
brewers . . . [who] engaged in interstate commerce”). In his Healy concurrence, Justice
Scalia labeled the extraterritoriality doctrine “both dubious and unnecessary to decide the
present cases.” Id. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring). Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642
(1982) (finding the statute was “a direct restraint on interstate commerce” that would
have thoroughly stifled the ability of out-of-state corporations to make tender offers).
45 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (finding that personal
jurisdiction can be established with a nexus-oriented approach).
46 See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s
Progressive Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 454–55 (2015).
47 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015).
48 Id. at 1170. See IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 29 n.27 (1st Cir. 2010)
(“Extraterritoriality has been the dormant branch of the dormant Commerce Clause.”).
This outlook is also shared by scholars. See, e.g., Denning, supra note 43, at 1006
(“[E]xtraterritoriality is, for all intents and purposes, dead.”).
49 See Epel, 793 F.3d at 1173–75. In Epel, the court stated:
[S]tate laws setting non-price standards for products sold in-state (standards
concerning, for example, quality, labeling, health, or safety) may be amenable
to scrutiny under the generally applicable Pike balancing test, or scrutinized
for traces of discrimination under Philadelphia, but the Court has never
suggested they trigger near-automatic condemnation under Baldwin.
Id. at 1173.
50 Id. at 1173.
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suggested that “[t]he extraterritoriality doctrine . . . is a relic of
the old world with no useful role to play in the new,”51 whose
elimination as a freestanding prohibition would not alter case
outcomes.52 There presently exists a debate amongst the circuits
regarding whether Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of
America v. Walsh,53 where the Court referred to the doctrine not
as “extraterritoriality” but rather “[t]he rule that was applied in
Baldwin and Healy,”54 limited its principle to price affirmation
statutes.55 Others have suggested that “the extraterritoriality
doctrine should apply only when the state directly regulates
out-of-state conduct or the state regulates in-state conduct in
such a way that it has the inescapable practical effect of
regulating out-of-state conduct in which the state has no
corresponding interest.”56
Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring).
Id. at 380–81 (arguing that extraterritoriality was not essential to the holdings in
Healey, Brown-Forman, Edgar, or Baldwin).
53 Pharm. Research & Mfr. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003).
54 Id.
55 See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937,
951 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Healy and Baldwin are not applicable to a statute that does not
dictate the price of a product and does not ‘t[ie] the price of its in-state products to
out-of-state prices.’”) (internal citation omitted); Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris,
794 F.3d 1136, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding “even when state law has significant
extraterritorial effects, it passes Commerce Clause muster when, as here, those effects
result from the regulation of in-state conduct” and distinguishing Sam Francis Found.
v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015), as “invalidating a . . . statute that ‘facially
regulates . . . wholly outside the State’s borders’”) (internal citation omitted); IMS Health
Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the Supreme Court “has only
struck down two related types of statutes on extraterritoriality grounds” which include
“price affirmation statutes” and “statutes that ‘force an out-of-state merchant to seek
regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another’”) (internal
citation omitted). But see Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 670 (4th Cir.
2018) (“The Supreme Court’s statement does not suggest that ‘[t]he rule that was applied
in Baldwin and Healy’ applies exclusively to ‘price control or price affirmation statutes.’
Instead, the Court’s statement emphasizes that the extraterritoriality principle is violated
if the state law at issue ‘regulate[s] the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its
express terms or by its inevitable effect.’”) (internal citation omitted); North Dakota
v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding “[t]he district court correctly
noted the Supreme Court has never so limited the [extraterritoriality] doctrine [to price
control], and indeed has applied it more broadly,” but declining to address claims that
extraterritorial legislation should be analyzed under the Pike balancing test or deemed
“per se invalid”). This debate predates Walsh. See, e.g., Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n
v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Although cases like Healy and Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. involved price affirmation statutes, the principles set forth in these
decisions are not limited to that context.”).
56 Schmitt, supra note 46, at 449; see also N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass’n v. City of New
York, 850 F.3d 79, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The Commerce Clause, however, does not void
every law that causes behavior to change in other states. Rather, the measure of
extraterritoriality is whether the Sourcing Law ‘inescapably require[s]’ breeders to
operate on the City’s terms even when doing business elsewhere.” (internal citations
omitted)); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] decision
to abandon the state’s market rests entirely with individual manufacturers based on the
opportunity cost of capital, their individual production costs, and what the demand in the
51
52
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II. NO COMMERCE IN ANIMAL CRUELTY
Litigation concerning foie gras bans in Chicago and
California is illustrative of how the courts have addressed
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to statutes governing the
sale of food produced through animal cruelty.57 On April 26,
2006, as part of the omnibus budget bill, the Chicago City
Council enacted legislation prohibiting the sale of foie gras in
“[a]ll food dispensing establishments.”58 The preamble to the
statute reiterated that under the Illinois constitution, the City
“may exercise any power and perform any function relating to its
government and affairs including protecting the health, safety
and welfare of its citizens” and by “ensuring the ethical
treatment of animals, who are the source of the food offered in
our restaurants, the City of Chicago is able to continue to offer
the best in dining experiences.”59 Immediately after adoption, the
Illinois Restaurant Association and Allen’s New American Cafe
sued in state court.60 They contended that:
[T]he Ordinance has nothing to do with health, safety, environmental
issues or governmental revenue generation. Nor does it fit into
traditional areas of state governmental interest in food regulation
since there is no tradition in Illinois of banning, on morality and
reputational grounds, food that has already been found safe on the
federal level for human consumption.61

The district court found for Chicago and held that the law did not
discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect since
it did “not force out-of-state foie gras producers or distributors to do
anything.”62 The court found that “the dormant Commerce Clause
state will bear. Because none of these variables is controlled by the state in this case, we
cannot say that the choice to stay or leave has been made for manufacturers by the state
legislature, as the Commerce Clause would prohibit.”); cf. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669 (limiting
extraterritoriality doctrine to instances where a statute “by its express terms or inevitable
effect” regulates extraterritorially).
57 See generally Kristin Cook, The Inhumanity of Foie Gras Production—Perhaps
California and Chicago Have the Right Idea, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 263, 263, 269–72
(2007); Rafi Youatt, Power, Pain, and the Interspecies Politics of Foie Gras, 65 POL. RES.
Q. 346, 346 (2011).
58 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 7-39-001–005 (2006), Amendment of Title 7, Chapter
39 of Muni. Code of Chicago by Addition of New Sections 001 and 005 Prohibiting Sale of
Foie Gras by Food Establishments Before the Comm. on Health, (Apr. 26, 2006) (repealed
May 14, 2008).
59 MARK CARP, THE FOIE GRAS WARS: HOW A 5,000-YEAR-OLD DELICACY INSPIRED
THE WORLD'S FIERCEST FOOD FIGHT 127 (2009).
60 After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge, the city removed the case to federal court. See Ill. Rest Ass’n v. City of
Chicago, No. 06 C 7014, 2007 WL 541926, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2007).
61 Plaintiffs’ Surreply Addressing New United States Supreme Court Decision, at 3,
Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (No. 06 C 7014),
2007 WL 1973283, at *3.
62 Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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applies to [facially] nondiscriminatory laws only where the law has
some sort of discriminatory effect or when judicial intervention is
necessary to promote national uniformity and thereby prevent
discrimination,”63 or citing the words of the Seventh Circuit in
National Paint,64 “[n]o disparate treatment, no disparate impact,
no problem under the dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause,”65 and
therefore the court was not required to apply Pike.66 The existence
of the Pike balancing test was not an excuse for the court to
engage in “‘general-purpose balancing’” and the court must look
for “‘discrimination rather than for baleful effects.’”67 The court did
acknowledge however that its decision was “in tension with other
Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit cases which do not delve into
the details of the dormant Commerce Clause.”68 Feeling that the
ordinance infringed on freedom of choice and made a national
embarrassment of Chicago,69 the Council repealed the law just
over two years later on May 14, 2008,70 while an appeal was
pending before the Seventh Circuit. 71 Illinois Restaurant
Association found that the regulation of foie gras was not a subject
requiring national uniformity and by treating in-state and
interstate interests the same, the dormant Commerce Clause was
not implicated and balancing was not warranted.72
The California statute, while older in origin, remains the
subject of litigation. In 2004, California adopted new provisions
63 Id. at 905. The Court also noted that “United Haulers . . . is yet another case that
recites the Pike standard in connection with a facially nondiscriminatory law but, in the
same breath, looks to whether the law has any discriminatory effects.” Id. See also
Francis, supra note 14, at 298 (“Analysis of whether a subject ‘requires’ a uniform
national standard . . . often seems to be a euphemism for burden review, rooted in a
practical economic assessment of the consequences of unilateral state regulation.”); Ass’n
des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 952 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[E]xamples of ‘courts finding uniformity necessary’ fall into the categories of
‘transportation’ or ‘professional sports league[s].’” (internal citation omitted)).
64 Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1132 (7th Cir. 1995).
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 Ill. Rest. Ass’n, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (quoting Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131).
68 Id. at 903–04 (referencing Alliant Energy Corp., Or. Waste Sys., and Clover Leaf).
69 See Nick Fox, Chicago Overturns Foie Gras Ban, N.Y. TIMES: DINER’S J. (May 14,
2008), http://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/chicago-overturns-foie-gras-ban/
[http://perma.cc/949N-TE7A] (“[T]he ban has been a source of embarrassment for the city
and the repeal comes as residents have accused officials of trying to micromanage people’s
lives . . . .”); see also Phil Vettel, Hold the Jokes the Rest of Yous: Foie Gras Back on Menus,
CHI. TRIB. (May 18, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-05-18/news/0805170435_1_foiegras-terrine-chicagoans [http://perma.cc/C6E9-JKBG] (“Ald. Bernard Stone (50th) quickly
recanted his support of the ban, saying, ‘Anybody who has traveled anywhere in this country
knows that people are just laughing their heads off at us.’”).
70 See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 7-39-001–005 (2006) (adopted Apr. 26, 2006),
repealed by Chicago, Ill., Ordinance 2008-2041 (May 14, 2008).
71 See Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 7014, 2008 WL 8915042, at *1,
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2008).
72 See Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905–06 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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of the California Health & Safety Code (sections 25981 and
25982) which prohibited the practice of force-feeding ducks or
geese to produce foie gras, as well as the in-state sale of products
made elsewhere from force-fed fowl.73 On July 2, 2012, the day
after the state law took effect, Association des Éleveurs de
Canards et d’Oies du Québec (hereafter “Canadian Farmers”), a
Canadian nonprofit which raises birds for foie gras, sued the
state of California (Association des Éleveurs I). The Canadian
Farmers argued that California’s ban on the sale of foie gras
violated the extraterritoriality doctrine because “the practical
effect—and perhaps the very purpose—of section 25982 is to
project California’s preferred agricultural practices on farmers
outside the state.”74 They contended that the law imposed a
burden on the poultry market without any corresponding local
benefit because “not a single duck or goose in California is
protected by applying section 25982 to . . . ducks and geese born,
raised, and slaughtered entirely outside the state.”75 These claims
were rejected as meritless by both the district court76 and Ninth
Circuit,77 with the latter observing that “[p]laintiffs give us no
reason to doubt that the State believed that the sales ban . . . may
discourage the consumption of products produced by force feeding
birds and prevent complicity in a practice that is deemed cruel to
animals.”78 The appellate court declined to conduct an analysis
under Pike of whether the statute’s benefits were illusory because
the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a significant burden on
interstate commerce.79 The law did not prohibit the sale of foie gras,
merely the most profitable method of production and “‘the dormant
Commerce Clause does not . . . guarantee [p]laintiffs their preferred
method of operation.”80 Plaintiffs also “failed to show that the foie
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25981–25982 (West 2018).
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 20, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du
Québec v. Harris, No. 12-56822, 2012 WL 5915406, at *20 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012).
75 Id. at *22.
76 Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, No. 2:12-CV-05735SVW-RZ, 2012 WL 12842942, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (“Preventing animal
cruelty in California is clearly a legitimate state interest . . . and Plaintiffs have presented
no evidence that Section 25982 is an ineffective means of advancing that goal. Plaintiffs
have thus failed to raise a serious question that Section 25982’s burden on interstate
commerce ‘clearly exceeds’ its local benefits.”).
77 Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 948–52
(9th Cir. 2013) (observing section 25982 is not discriminatory and does not directly
regulate or substantially burden interstate commerce).
78 Id. at 952 (citing Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476
F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that ban on slaughter and sale of horsemeat for
human consumption may “increase the preservation of horses” by “removing the
significant monetary incentives”)).
79 See id. at 951–52 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682
F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012)).
80 Id. at 949 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists, 682 F.3d at 1151).
73
74
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gras market is inherently national or that it requires a uniform
system of regulation”81 or any existing competing legislation
indicating balkanization. The Supreme Court “has never
invalidated a state or local law under the dormant Commerce
Clause based upon mere speculation about the possibility of
conflicting legislation.”82 The Supreme Court denied the foie gras
companies’ petition for certiorari on October 14, 2014.83 Association
des Eleveurs I found the statute barred how, but not where, an item
is produced, and therefore Pike balancing was unnecessary.
Indeed, not a single animal cruelty statute challenged on
Commerce Clause grounds has been struck down on that basis. This
includes bans on horsemeat for human consumption upheld by the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits,84 and the Ninth Circuit decision
upholding California’s ban on the sale or distribution of shark fins.85
This also includes two statutes arguably regulating production
methods: A California ban on the slaughter of non-ambulatory
animals challenged on dormant Commerce Clause grounds but
Id. at 952.
Id. at 951 (quoting S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001)).
See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 135 S. Ct. 398
(2014) cert. denied. Subsequently, the plaintiffs amended their complaint in the district
court seeking declaratory relief asserting that section 25982 was preempted by the
Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du
Québec v. Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The district court found that
the PPIA expressly preempted section 25982 and granted the motion for partial summary
judgment while declining to reach any of the other arguments. See id. at 1147–48. The
Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated in part, finding that the foie gras statute was not
preempted by the PPIA expressly or under the doctrines of field or obstacle preemption,
and remanded the proceedings. See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec
v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017). On March 9, 2018, a petition for
certiorari was docketed by the plaintiffs and a Call for the Views of the Solicitor General
by the Court was issued on June 18, 2018 to which he responded on December 5, 2018
recommending denial. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et
d’Oies du Québecv. Becerra, No. 17A793 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2018); see also Ass’n des Éleveurs de
Canards et d’Oies du Québecv. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2668 (2018) (mem.), Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québecv. Becerra, No. 17A793.
84 See Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V., v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 335
(5th Cir. 2007); Cavel Int’l v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 544–55 (7th Cir. 2007).
85 See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2015).
The court upheld a finding by the district court that “given that the Shark Fin Law is
facially neutral, and treats all shark fins the same, regardless of their origin, plaintiffs
have not shown (and cannot show) that the Shark Fin Law either regulates
extraterritorially, or discriminates in favor of in-state interests.” Chinatown
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Brown, No. C 12-3759 PJH, 2013 WL 60919, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
2, 2013). Finding that the animal cruelty and the health and conservation benefits of the
law outweighed the insignificant commercial burden on interstate commerce, the court held
in the absence of a significant burden, it would be inappropriate for them “to determine [its]
constitutionality . . . based on our assessment of the benefits of th[e] law [ ] and the State’s
wisdom in adopting [it],” or the availability of less-burdensome alternatives. Chinatown
Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1147 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians
v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Ninth Circuit further discounted
the extraterritorial claims saying such effects only are violative when states attempt to fix
prices beyond their borders. Id. at 1146.
81
82
83
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ultimately struck down by the Court for Federal Meat Inspection Act
(FMIA) preemption,86 and a New York statute prohibiting the sale of
wild birds not raised in captivity upheld by the Second Circuit.87
III. PROPOSITION 2 AND AB 1437: CALIFORNIA EGGS ON
THE STATES
After a voter-initiated initiative campaign, on November 4,
2008, California, by a margin of 63.5% to 36.5%, 88 passed
Proposition 2 which required “calves raised for veal, egg-laying
hens and pregnant pigs be confined only in ways that allow these
animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn
around freely” by 2015.89 In 2010, the California legislature
enacted AB 1437 which banned the sale within the state of eggs
from out-of-state farms unless those farmers subjected themselves
to the same confinement standards.90 In adopting the latter, the
legislature, in their stated purpose, sought to “protect California
consumers from the deleterious, health, safety, and welfare effects
of the sale and consumption of eggs derived from egg-laying hens
that are exposed to significant stress and many result in increased
exposure to disease pathogens including salmonella.”91
Even before taking effect, Proposition 2 and AB 1437 spawned
numerous lawsuits challenging the ordinances.92 In 2012, the first
See Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 468 (2012).
See Cresenzi Bird Imps. v. New York, 831 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming the
opinion below). “New York has a legitimate interest in regulating its local market
conditions which lead, in a short causal chain, to the unjustifiable and senseless suffering
and death of thousands of captured wild birds.” Cresenzi Bird Imps. v. New York, 658 F.
Supp. 1441, 1447 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (internal citation omitted).
88 Votes For And Against November 4, 2008, State Ballot Measures, CAL. BOARD OF
E LECTIONS , http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2008-general/7_votes_for_against.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MTD7-Z4Y3]; see also Cal. Sec’y of State, Prevention of Farm Animal
Cruelty Act, in C ALIFORNIA G ENERAL E LECTION : O FFICIAL VOTER I NFORMATION
GUIDE 16 (2008), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ED6V-EKNK].
89 Attorney General, Prop 2 Standards For Confining Farm Animals. Initiative Statute,
CAL. GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 4, 2008), http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/title-sum/prop2title-sum.htm [http://perma.cc/FZJ8-BA5W]; see also Letter from Joe Ramsey to Toni Melton,
Initiative Coordinator, Office of the Attorney Gen., Request for Title and Summary for Proposed
Initiative (Aug. 9, 2007), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/initiatives/2007-08-09_07-0041_Initiative.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DCD3-CNS7].
90 2010 Cal. Stat. 51. On November 6, 2018, California voters approved Proposition 12
replacing the Proposition 2 size restrictions based on animal behavior with specific numbers of
square feet and ban the sale of non-conforming veal and pork as of 2020. California Election
Results, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/
us/elections/results-california-elections.html; Letter from Cheri Shankar, to Ashley Johansson,
Initiative Coordinator, Request For Title and Summary of Proposed Initiative (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/17-0026%20%28Animal%20Cruelty%29_0.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2FC7-2YUP].
91 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25995(e) (West 2018).
92 See, e.g., JS West Milling Co. v. State, No. 10-CECG-04225 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2011)
(dismissing on ripeness grounds the allegations that Proposition 2 was unconstitutionally
86
87
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federal suit was brought by a California egg farmer, William
Cramer, who challenged the Proposition 2 cage size requirement
as unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, because it did not identify satisfactory cage
specifications,93 and as violating the Commerce Clause by forcing the
closure and relocation of California egg farmers which in turn would
lead to increased consumer prices and disruption of the national corn
feed market.94 The district court dismissed the claims, finding that
the law was not vague but rather established a clear test that “does
not require the law enforcement officer to have the investigative
acumen of Columbo”95 and that Cramer’s “factual allegations are
wholly insufficient to raise his [Commerce Clause] claim above the
speculative level”96 since, as the plaintiff acknowledged, “the
prevention of animal cruelty is a legitimate state interest.”97
After Cramer appealed, the Ninth Circuit, without hearing oral
arguments, affirmed the motion to dismiss in a brief, unpublished
February 2015 opinion which only addressed the void for vagueness
claim and made no mention of the Commerce Clause.98
In February 2014, Missouri filed suit,99 alleging AB 1437
violated the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United
States Constitution and were further “expressly and implicitly
preempted by the federal Egg Products Inspection Act” (EPIA).100
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing in October
2014, finding it “patently clear” the plaintiffs were “bringing this
action on behalf of a subset of each state’s egg farmers and their
purported right to participate in the laws that govern them, not on
behalf of each state’s population generally.”101 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, finding that “[t]he complaint contain[ed] no
vague because it did not specify compliant cage dimensions); Ass’n of Calif. Egg Farms
v. State, No. 12-CECG-03695-DSB, 2013 WL 9668707, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 22,
2013) (finding that definition of confinement standards in terms of “animal behaviors
rather than in square inches” did not make Proposition 2 facially vague). See also, Molly
L. Wiltshire, Of Eggs and Hens: Pro Bono Opportunities in the Area of Animal Law,
SCHIFF HARDIN (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/publications/2016/ofeggs-and-hens-pro-bono-opportunities-in-the-area-of-animal-law [http://perma.cc/T39C-JQTV].
93 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cramer v. Brown, (No. CV
12 - 03130 JFW (JEMx)), 2012 WL 1230649 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2012).
94 Id. at 6.
95 Cramer v. Brown, No. CV123130JFWJEMX, 2012 WL 13059699, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 12, 2012).
96 Id. at *5.
97 Id. (“[T]he prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law,
starting with the early settlement of the Colonies.” (citing United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 469 (2010))).
98 See Cramer v. Harris, 591 F. App’x 634, 635 (9th Cir. 2015).
99 See Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1063 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (five other
states—Alabama, Kentucky, Iowa, Oklahoma and Nebraska—subsequently joined the suit).
100 Id. at 1065; 21 U.S.C. § 1031 (2018).
101 Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
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specific allegations about the statewide magnitude of [the alleged
difficult choices engendered by the law] or the extent to which they
affect[ed] more than just an ‘identifiable group of individual’ egg
farmers”102 and “the unavoidable uncertainty of the alleged future
changes in price ma[de] the alleged injury insufficient for Article III
standing.”103 A petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court in May 2017.104
In December 2017, the plaintiff States, with the exception of
Kentucky, and joined by Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin, filed an
original jurisdiction action with the Supreme Court.105 The motion
alleged AB 1437 was motivated by economic protectionism,
relying at least in part on Governor Schwarzenegger’s signing
statement: “[b]y ensuring that all eggs sold in California meet the
requirements of Proposition 2, this bill is good for both California
egg producers and animal welfare.”106 The plaintiff States contend
that AB 1437 “has not provided any significant health-and-safety
benefits to Californians” or other persons and the “recited purpose
was pretextual” with “no convincing scientific evidence” of
correlation between salmonella incidence or stress levels and cage
size or stocking density.107 Rather, they asserted the statute “was
designed to impose onerous restrictions on out-of-state egg
producers to . . . eliminate any competitive disadvantage to
California producers arising from California’s stifling regulatory
environment.”108 Under their reading, AB 1437 “did not affect the
welfare of any animal in California” nor did it “regulate any activity
within California” but rather “applies only to egg production
occurring outside California, and its direct impact is exclusively
extraterritorial to California.”109 Relying on the record from the
legislative deliberations,110 the plaintiff States asserted “[t]he sole
102 Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied
sub nom. Missouri ex rel. Hawley v. Becerra, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017) (quoting Alfred L.
Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
103 Id. at 653.
104 See Hawley, 137 S. Ct. at 2188.
105 Motion For Leave To File Bill Of Complaint, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148
(U.S. Dec. 4, 2017).
106 LEG. OF CAL., ASSEMB. J., Reg. Sess., vol. 5, at 5961 (2009–2010).
107 Motion For Leave To File Bill of Complaint, supra note 105, at 18.
108 Id. at 19.
109 Id. at 20. See also Brief of Ass’n. Des Éleveurs De Canards Et D’oies Du Québec,
HVFG L.L.C., and Hot’s Rest. Grp., as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs at 8, Indiana
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (“If any of the farm animals at issue in these cases feel any
discomfort, they do so far beyond California’s borders — and thus far beyond the State’s
legitimate legislative reach.”).
110 “The intent of this legislation is to level the playing field so that in-state producers are not
disadvantaged.” Kevin De Leon, CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, BILL ANALYSIS OF AB
1437, at 1 (May 13, 2009), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_14011450/
ab_1437_cfa_20090512_182647_asm_comm.html [http://perma.cc/9UFY-BKB2].
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purpose and effect of AB 1437 was to regulate the conduct of egg
producers outside California.”111 Additionally, they contended
“California affronts the sovereignty of Plaintiff States” by
dispatching inspectors to farms within their borders.112
In its response papers, California noted that “[b]oth
Proposition 2 and AB 1437 address activities occurring within
California” and “AB 1437 applies uniformly (and only) to in-state
sales, wherever the eggs may have been produced.”113 It
distinguished AB 1437 from the price-control laws struck down in
Healey, Brown-Forman, and Baldwin as “indifferent to how eggs
sold in other States are produced or priced.”114 In response to the
plaintiff States’ allegations about legislative intent to “level the
playing field,” California argued that:
[T]he dormant Commerce Clause forbids States from adopting measures
that privilege in-state companies at the expense of out-of-state ones. The
Constitution does not require a State to confer preferential treatment on
out-of-state entities that choose to sell their products within that State, or
to exempt those entities from the same neutral rules that apply to
in-state sellers.115

IV. THIRTEEN STATES HAVE A COW WHEN MASSACHUSETTS
GOVERNS VEAL
On November 8, 2016, Massachusetts, at a public referendum
by a margin of 77.7% to 22.3%,116 adopted “An Act to Prevent
Cruelty to Farm Animals” which prohibited the sale in
Massachusetts, after January 1, 2022, of certain eggs, veal, and
pork based on the conditions in which the animals were
confined.117 The stated primary purpose of the legislation was “to
prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm
animal confinement which also threaten the health and safety of
Massachusetts consumers, increase the risk of foodborne illness,
and have negative fiscal impacts on the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.”118 In December 2017, Indiana, joined by Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin filed
111 Reply Brief of Plaintiff States at 5–6, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148 (U.S.
Mar. 20, 2018).
112 Id.
113 Brief in Opposition at 1, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018).
114 Id. at 23.
115 Id. at 24–25.
116 See An Act to Prevent Cruelty to Animals, V OTE S MART : F ACTS M ATTER ,
https://votesmart.org/elections/ballot-measure/2184/an-act-to-prevent-cruelty-to-farmanimals#.W6FtVehKg2w [http://perma.cc/G883-HRS6].
117 An Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals, ch. 333 (Mass. 2016),
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2016/Chapter333 [http://perma.cc/8PBF-LZR5].
118 Id.
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suit before the Supreme Court.119 The plaintiff States sought to
distinguish the justification of the “Animal Law” by reference to “the
conditions of production simpliciter” from previously upheld laws
concerning the quality of the products.120 They contended that, “while
Pike balancing is appropriate where states regulate interstate
commerce as part of a legitimate attempt to protect the health and
safety of citizens, it does not apply where a state is simply trying to
export its preferred public policy to other states.”121 They asserted
the law “constitutes economic protectionism and extraterritorial
regulation” because “farmers in Plaintiff States must now submit to
Massachusetts’s laws, as well as those of any state that adopts
similar regulations, in order to have access to those states’
markets.”122 “[W]hile Massachusetts may legitimately protect its
consumers from harmful foodstuffs produced elsewhere, it may not
leverage access to its markets to regulate every station in the supply
chain of agricultural commodities.”123 The plaintiff states in the
Massachusetts litigation argued that the regulations would force
out-of-state farming operations to “alter their production methods
with respect to commercial activities occurring wholly outside”
Massachusetts and were “not directed at the quality of covered
products but rather at the means or characteristics of production of
such covered products.”124
In its papers, Massachusetts countered that the plaintiff
States’ dormant Commerce Clause claims were “foreclosed by
centuries of precedent”125 and the State’s legitimate interests in
regulating its food supply outweighed any incidental burden on
interstate commerce.126 Attorney General Maura Healey asserted
that Massachusetts was “plac[ing] no special ‘burdens on the flow of
commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those
borders would not bear’”127 and took particular note that the statute
only governs sales where the buyer took physical possession within
Massachusetts, allowing noncompliant food products, and animals

119 Motion For Leave To File A Bill Of Complaint, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No.
22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).
120 Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 4–5, Indiana
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2018).
121 Id. at 6.
122 Bill of Complaint at 13, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).
123 Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 6, Indiana
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).
124 Bill of Complaint, supra note 122, at 13.
125 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 2, Indiana
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018).
126 Id. at 27 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
127 Id. at 28 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429,
433 (2005)).
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in cages noncompliant with the minimum-size requirements, to
travel freely across its borders if bound for another state.128
V. FEDS: CASES DON’T MEAT STANDARDS FOR GRANT
On April 16, 2018, the Supreme Court issued Calls for the
Views of the Solicitor General (CVSGs) in both cases.129 The
Solicitor
General
responded
on
November
29th,
recommending denial of the motions for leave.130 While the
majority of the filings focused on the inappropriateness of the
cases for an exercise of original jurisdiction as no direct
economic injury by the defendant states had been shown,131
the government also argued that the laws were not violative of
the Dormant Commerce Clause.132 The statutes did not
discriminate as they treated all products alike without any
local preference,133 and assessing the health and safety
rationales under Pike or “whether the practical effect of the
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
state” would require resolution of complex factual issues best
undertaken by the district courts.134 Additionally, the Solicitor
General argued that the EPIA did not preempt the California
ordinance since the USDA egg-grading standards do not
address confinement conditions.135
Of note in their papers, the government declined to
address the permissible scope of a cruelty rationale, suggested
that even in the absence of discrimination a Pike analysis is
necessary, and, possibility in a nod to Gorsuch,136 called
“extraterritoriality” not that name, but rather, as “Baldwin
and its progeny,” which it characterized as “forbidding States
from attempting to regulate the price of products sold in
another State.”137
VI. HATCHING CONCLUSIONS
The confinement statutes, which apply equally to in-state
and out-of-state farmers, implicate neither of the concerns
Id. at 28–29.
Missouri v. California, 138 S. Ct. 1585 (2018) (mem.); Indiana v. Massachussetts,
138 S. Ct. 1585 (2018) (mem.).
130 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149; Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148.
131 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148,
at *8–18.
132 Id. at *20–22.
133 See id. at *21.
134 See id. at *21–22.
135 Id. at *7.
136 See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015).
137 See supra note 131, at *22.
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animating modern Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence: intentional economic protectionism or the imposition
of undue burdens.138 The California and Massachusetts legislatures
and electorates respectively have made a policy determination that
the animal welfare and related public health rationales for
prohibiting the sale of products not satisfying their confinement
standards outweigh any economic impacts or interests in those
choices. These determinations of the public interest—that
so confined animals are not suitable for consumption—have already
been made and since neither statute inescapably requires any
business to alter their practices and conduct business in other
states in conformity with their regulations, or precludes any other
state from regulating these products in a different manner, there is
no justification nor need for the Court to assert its views over them.
The California and Massachusetts statutes share many
attributes and therefore can be considered jointly for the
purposes of repudiating the extraterritorial attacks on their
validity. However, despite the lack of treatment by the Solicitor
General, the unique adoption of AB 1437 sets California apart for
the purposes of assessing the presence of discrimination. While
AB 1437 does not favor California egg farmers, it does benefit
them by placing out-of-state producers on equal footing. Some
have asked “whether the dormant Commerce Clause requires
discrimination against in-state producers”139 and the plaintiff
States’ argument would fault California for their political
process—if they had passed AB 1437 without previously passing
Prop. 2 it would not be susceptible to challenge as protectionist.
Even though a benefit inures to in-state interests by the similar
burdening of interstate commerce with regulations to which the
former is already subject, the treatment is not differential and
therefore ipso facto not discriminatory. AB 1437 does not refer
specifically to out-of-state farms and so is a non-discriminatory
statute, notwithstanding the pre- and ongoing existence of Prop.
2, which the legislature is unable to formally reconcile because of
constitutional prohibitions.140
Protectionist bans, even if partial, are “local measures for
control and suppression of the problem [that] are in force [and] are
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018).
David M. Driesen, Must the States Discriminate Against Their Own Producers
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2016). See also Nat’l
Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 857 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To the extent that Proposition
4 has any discriminatory effect, it would be in favor of interstate commercial activities
undertaken by out-of-state actors.”(emphasis in original)); Reynolds v. Buchholzer, 87
F.3d 827, 829–30 (6th Cir. 1996).
140 See CAL. CONST. art II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors . . . .”).
138
139
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generally comparable in their impact to the embargo on imports.”141
California “has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly
understood [health] risks, despite the possibility that they may
ultimately prove to be negligible” and cannot be expected to “sit idly
by and wait . . . until the scientific community agrees on what
[ ] organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such
consequences.”142 Therefore, even if the Court were to conclude AB
1437—because of its structuring or the legislative record—was
protectionist, it should recognize it as falling within the bounds of
an acceptable exception because its effects are not discriminatory.
In the absence of discriminatory effect or intent, the Pike analysis is
inapplicable in these cases.143 As the ordinances in question neither
burden nor discriminate against interstate commerce, they receive
rational basis review. The Court should be cognizant of its
admonition in United Haulers to “not seek to reclaim
[a Lochner-esque] ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of
the dormant Commerce Clause” and reject the plaintiffs’ “invitations
to rigorously scrutinize [this] legislation passed under the auspices of
the police power.”144 The Court must be mindful to not let the
doctrine become “a roving license for federal courts to decide what
activities are appropriate for state and local government to
undertake, and what activities must be the province of private
market competition” as “the contrary approach . . . would lead to
unprecedented and unbounded interference by the courts with state
and local government.”145
In this diversified and international market, the clear
majority of police power exercises are liable to implicate interstate
commerce. However, in the absence of discrimination, the burden
of statute borne of a legitimate public purpose “is one which the
Constitution permits because it is an inseparable incident of the
exercise of a legislative authority, which, under the Constitution,
has been left to the states.”146 If the ordinances seek to prevent
cruelty to animals occurring in the course of trade, they cannot
be said to lack a rational basis.147 That AB 1437 “does not protect
the welfare of any animal in California” is irrelevant; the belief
by the state legislature that eliminating a portion of the market
for so-confined eggs will lead to better treatment is legitimate
See Regan, supra note 13, at 1270.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (discussing a Maine statute that
prohibited the import of bait fishing).
143 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
144 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
347 (2007).
145 Id. at 343.
146 S.C. St. Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938).
147 See Cavel Int’l. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 559 (7th Cir. 2007).
141
142
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purpose enough.148 The California and Massachusetts statutes are
“demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism.”149 It has been more than three decades150 since the
Court invalidated a statute under the “permissive” balancing
test151 and should not start here, especially where the legitimate
public interest, putative or otherwise, is of such great weight. The
Solicitor General suggests that additional inquiry is necessary to
properly perform Pike, but where statutes do not have a
discriminatory effect, the Pike analysis is inapplicable;152 the
confinement statutes do not regulate on the basis of location, do not
favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests and neither
burden nor discriminate against interstate commerce and therefore
should only be reviewed under rational basis which they easily
surpass. The dormant Commerce Clause is simply not implicated
when the burdens of a regulation are borne equally by in-state
and out-of-state interests.153
Extraterritoriality, if applied even when the challenged statute
does not implement protectionist discrimination, is wholly divorced
from the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause,154 and, absent
some limiting principle, poses a broad threat to a state’s authority
to regulate conduct with direct effects within its bounds.155 This
over-inclusivity may indeed do damage to the principles
animating the dormant Commerce Clause by striking down laws
facilitating interstate commerce.156 Unlike the pre-1989 laws
struck down by the Court under the extraterritoriality doctrine,
these laws do not, either by their terms or effect, directly regulate
the sale of covered animal products in other states or prevent any
other state from regulating the same production methods
148 See Motion For Leave To File Bill of Complaint, supra note 105, at 20; see also
Empacadora De Carnes de Fresnillo v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 335–37 (5th Cir. 2007).
149 Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)).
150 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643–46 (1982).
151 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
347 (2007).
152 See supra note 32–33 and accompanying text.
153 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (finding that the
prohibition on operation of retail service stations did not create any barrier to interstate
interests and therefore did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
154 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
155 See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f
any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of state is per se unconstitutional,
wouldn’t we have to strike down state health and safety regulations that require
out-of-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels?” (internal citation omitted)).
156 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 (6th. Cir 2013) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (“Even a hypothetical state law that facilitated interstate commerce—say, an
Ohio law that gave tax credits to automobile companies that keep open the production lines
of their factories in Michigan and elsewhere—would be invalid if it had extraterritorial
‘practical effect[s].’” (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 326, 336 (1989))).
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differently in their own jurisdiction. The simultaneous co-existence
of the statutes challenged in these suits undermines any claim
that each statute disrupts a national scheme. While evolving
production standards may raise the specter of conflicting regimes,
it is not a court’s place to assume hypotheticals.157 While the
passage of price affirmation statutes in every state would result in
“competing and interlocking local economic regulation,”158 passage
of confinement standards would result in national uniformity. To
the extent one regime remains more restrictive than the others, it
is up to each interstate market participant to determine for itself
whether to comply with the most stringent and therefore continue
to serve all states or narrow the jurisdictions in which they
participate.159 While out-of-state egg and hog farmers may choose
to alter their production methods with regard to products for sale
in other states—transactions in which California and
Massachusetts have no interest—to avoid the costs of two distinct
systems or spread the costs more broadly, nothing in either statute
requires such meaning that such impacts are not “inescapable.”160
It is incumbent on the Court to “surrende[r] former views”161 of
“heightened . . . stare decisis in the dormant Commerce Clause
context”162 “to a better considered position”163 and recognize the
dormancy of the presently conceived dormant Commerce Clause
tests. Only by narrowing them to more closely reflect the
interconnected realities of the present global economy will they do
justice to the competing goals of federalism: state sovereignty and
the equality of state law.164

See Regan, supra note 13, at 1148.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 326, 336 (1989).
See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773, 795 (1945) (invalidating state train
length law and noting that the alternative to breaking up trains at state borders “is for
the carrier to conform to the lowest train limit restriction of any of the states through
which its trains pass, whose laws thus control the carriers’ operations both within and
without the regulating state”); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II)
Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1881 (1987) (“The commercial
enterprise that chooses to operate in more than one state must simply be prepared to
confirm its various local operations to more than one set of laws. The Constitution does
not give an enterprise any special privileges just because it happens to operate across
state lines.”).
160 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
161 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
162 Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S.
162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
164 See Schmitt, supra note 46, at 426.
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